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ADVANCED PRODUCERS OR MORAL POLLUTERS? CHINA’S 











There is a popular saying about the relationship between money, gender and sexual 
morality in the People’s Republic of China (PRC): ‘Men who get rich become immoral; 
women only get rich after they become immoral’ (nanren zheng qian jiu bian hui; nüren 
bian hui cai you qian). Like most aphorisms, this observation appeals to commonsense or 
public perceptions of how things are. As one foreign correspondent explains: 
 
In China these days, people are talking about sex—extramarital affairs, prostitution 
and rich men taking mistresses. Many are worried that sex is becoming a 
commodity, leading to the exploitation of women. This comes after years of 
government efforts to eradicate traces of pre-communist decadence (Kuhn 2007). 
 
In the words of another: China’s post-1978 shift from a planned to a market-based 
economy ‘has lifted millions of people out of poverty and created a new class of 
millionaires’. However, unlike new freedoms and opportunities, ‘get-rich-quick schemes, 
casual sex, and animosity between rich and poor’, are worrying trends. Voices in the 
Chinese media and academia warn that economic progress has been accompanied by 
moral decay, which ‘could destabilize society’ (Chao 2005). 
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The argument that economic progress in the form of marketization sounds the death-knell 
for communitarian and traditional moral values is longstanding. Ever since ‘Marx wrote 
on alienation, Durkheim on anomie, and Weber on the iron cage of capitalism’, political 
commentators have either decried or praised the heightened individualism, secularism, 
and instrumental rationality, that is associated with the capitalist wage-labour system 
(Weller 1998: 78). Similarly, commentators have either condemned or lauded the 
globalization of free markets, which are usually associated with Western liberal 
democracies, for destroying local cultures and communities or for bringing much-needed 
civilizational progress to backward, despotic, and under-developed countries (Chua 2003; 
Fukuyama 1992). 
 
In the case of China, a political economy that is characterized by the surprisingly 
successful, if unexpected, marriage of communism and the market (socialism with 
Chinese characteristics), public discussions of the links between rising wealth and 
declining morals draw on similar narratives of social change, albeit with different 
inflections. Deng Xiaoping’s advocacy of the slogan: ‘Let one segment of the population 
get rich first and guide others along the way’, and Jiang Zeming’s ‘Three Represents’ 
theory, which welcomes representatives of the advanced productive forces, i.e., private 
entrepreneurs,
 
into the ranks of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are praised by many 
commentators in both China and the West for promoting unprecedented economic growth 
and catapulting China into a western-orientated model of modernity (see Herberer and 
Schubert 2006: 9-28).
1
 Although Party stalwarts occasionally lament the perceived 
decline in socialist values that economic reform has brought in tow, those who associate 
market-based reforms with democratization routinely applaud private entrepreneurs for 
initiating a welcome rejection of the constraints associated with the former ‘puritanical 
Confucian-socialist system’ (e.g. Zheng 2006: 163-4). Indeed, for those who associate 
market-based reforms with political and social liberalization, China’s private 
entrepreneurs are at the vanguard of a newly emerging middle-class that has the potential 
to transform China’s authoritarian and traditional socio-political system into a modern 
and more liberal one. 
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Yet the Chinese public are said to mistrust China’s ‘brash and flashy generation’ of new-
rich entrepreneurs for making and spending their money in dubious ways (Toy 2007: 15). 
Forbes’ 2006 China Rich List highlights the new opportunities that are available to 
entrepreneurs, with most of the wealth recorded coming from listed companies rather 
than inherited wealth, and 12 of the top 20 contenders being under 40 years of age 
(Gordon 2007). However, such new-found wealth is not always based on the neo-liberal 
ideal of a combination of innovation and hard work. Wong Kwong-yu, top of the Forbes 
2006 China Rich List, is being investigated for illegal loans; Zhang Rongkun, a real 
estate and highway developer who made number 16 on the Forbes 2005 List was arrested 
in relation to a Shanghai fund scandal; and Zhou Zhengyi, a real estate magnate who 
made number 11 on a former Forbes List was jailed in 2003 for fraud and security 
offences (ibid.). Thus, contrary to President Hu Jintao’s proclaimed goal of building a 
‘well-off and harmonious China’, many commentators argue that the established links 
between flagrant corruption and personal wealth accumulation, as well as the growing 
disparity between the ostentatious high-consumption life-style of the new rich and that of 
the ‘have-nots’, are exacerbating the social tensions born of an increasingly inequitable 
and polarized society (Chao 2005; Gordon 2007; Kuhn 2007). These tensions are 
heightened by virtue of the seeming radical departure in the reform era from the 
characteristic egalitarianism, collectivism, and moral certainty, of the Maoist period 
(1949-76). 
 
Public condemnation of China’s new rich as corrupt polluters of socialist virtue is 
particularly pronounced in discussions of enterprising cadres or bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs. Unlike cadres under the pre-reform command economy, whose main 
responsibility was to implement the state plan and other party directives, bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs are party and state officials who are expected to display initiative in the 
marketplace, by engaging in revenue-generating and other activities directed at advancing 
economic development using the institutional power and resources of the communist 
system (Gore 1999: 30). They occupy a diverse range of positions, from mayors to 
provincial governors, enterprise managers to corporate CEOs, village chiefs to township 
directors, and ‘from CCP party committee secretaries to ordinary party members holding 
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key positions in public administration’ (Gore 1997). But they are unified as a group by 
the fact that their positions of power and authority flow from a top-down appointment. 
While earning far less than private entrepreneurs, they constitute part of China’s new rich 
because of their extraordinary access to business opportunities and state resources, 
including investment capital, expensive foreign cars and good accommodation. Their 
lower income, yet privileged access to major resources, has reportedly encouraged 
corruption insofar as bureaucratic entrepreneurs ‘can generate personal economic gains 
through illicit or illegal means more effectively than through legitimate mechanisms’ 
(Gore 1997). 
 
Apart from involvement in economic corruption, China’s bureaucratic entrepreneurs are 
said to be particularly adept at exploiting their privileged access to public resources to 
secure the sexual services of women. Many recent high-ranking corruption cases have 
been linked to the new phenomenon of ‘xing huilu’ or sex-related bribery and corruption 
(Jeffreys 2006: 159-78; Jin 2000: 83-7). The first and most notorious case involving 
allegations of sex-related bribery and corruption was that of Zhang Erjiang, the former 
Secretary of Tianmen City in Hubei Province. On 23-25 July 2002, Zhang Erjiang was 
tried for accepting bribes amounting to 700,000 yuan and US$4,300, and for embezzling 
100,000 yuan in public funds (Li Gang 2002). During the course of this trial, Chinese 
media reports focused not only on his economic crimes, but also on his arguably more 
serious yet ‘not-punishable’ moral crimes. Zhang had allegedly abused his position of 
power and authority to have sex with over 100 women, including 15 female cadres. Of 
these 15 cadres, seven women had received a promotion following from their affair with 
Zhang, as had the husbands of two others. Extrapolating from this and other cases, media 
reports contend that virtually 100 per cent of high-ranking corrupt officials who accept 
bribes and embezzle public funds either keep a mistress, exchange favours for sex, and/or 
hire the services of female sexual service providers (Dai and Lu 2000; Ji 2001; Li 
Zhufeng 2002: 22-3). More recent examples of bureaucratic entrepreneurs who have been 
implicated in scandals involving power, sex, and money, include: Vice Admiral Wang 
Shouye, previously one of five navy deputy commanders and a member of China’s 
legislature, for accepting bribes from property developers (Watts 2006); and Shanghai 
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party secretary, Chen Liangyu, for involvement in the mismanagement of the city’s social 
security fund (Savadore 2006). 
 
This chapter examines the dichotomous construction of China’s new (male) rich as both 
the most advanced productive forces and also as corrupt polluters of socialist morality. 
Section one provides an historical background by explaining how nineteenth century 
Western accounts of the middle classes as the standard-bearers of enlightened progress 
were inverted in twentieth century China via Marxist debates on social inequality and 
through the actions of the early Chinese Communist Party. Section two discusses how the 
new rich have been created and framed as the simultaneous heroes and villains of 
economic reform via debates on socialism with Chinese characteristics and issues such as 
mistress-keeping and prostitution. The third section concludes that Western constructions 
of China’s new rich as the middle class vanguard of progressive social change are 
seriously challenged by their routine portrayal in China as both advanced economic 
producers and moral polluters. I argue that this particular ‘group’ is currently unable to 
challenge one important aspect of Chinese Communist Party politics—-it has failed to 
present a serious challenge to the Party-state’s historic claim to represent and struggle for 
social and sexual equality. 
 
Who are our enemies? Who are our friends? 
 
In a 1926 article entitled, ‘Analysis of the classes in Chinese society’, Mao Zedong, the 
founder and former leader of the PRC, stated: ‘Who are our enemies? Who are our 
friends? This is a question of the first importance for the revolution’ (Mao Tse-tung 
1926). Mao answered these questions in a 1940 article, ‘On New Democracy’, which was 
to become the political basis upon which the new state known as the People’s Republic of 
China was founded in 1949 (Mao Tse-tung 1940). The PRC was envisioned as a ‘new 
democratic dictatorship of the people’ based on an alliance of the proletariat, the rural 
peasantry, and China’s national and petit bourgeoisie,2 under the leadership of the 
Chinese Communist Party. One of its primary goals was to oppose the enemies of the 
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revolution, namely, big landlords, major entrepreneurs, and representatives of the rival 
nationalist party (the Guomindang), for representing exploitative feudal, capitalist and 
imperialist forces. Unlike the former Soviet Union, Mao maintained that the PRC could 
not immediately establish a (socialist) dictatorship of the proletariat, because China had 
not yet undergone the pre-requisite Western-style bourgeois-capitalist revolution—
processes of industrialization accompanied by the overthrow of the decadent upper-
classes by the more progressive middle classes. Instead, Mao argued that due to China’s 
unique experience as a semi-capitalist and semi-colonial country, the Chinese proletariat 
should unite as friends, but without compromising their revolutionary quality, with both 
the rural peasantry and the Chinese middle classes to form a new democratic dictatorship. 
 
China’s commercial and middle-classes occupied an ambiguous position within Mao’s 
New Democracy formulation of the enemy/friend dichotomy. On the one hand, they were 
categorized as political friends, flowing from their historical opposition to Japan’s 
invasion of China and their inevitable displacement of old-style, feudal social relations 
with new-style, capitalist relations of production. On the other hand, the very 
entanglement of China’s commercial classes with ‘capitalism’ and the rival Guomindang 
meant that they were also defined as prone ‘to conciliation with the enemies of the 
revolution’, that is, as destined to oppose the PRC’s future advance into socialism (Mao 
Tse-tung 1940). To restrict their inherent political conservatism, Mao proposed that the 
national bourgeoisie could assist the state with the goal of industrializing China, but that 
all large banks, and all large industrial and commercial enterprises, should be 
nationalized and placed under state administration, so that private capital would not be 
allowed to dominate the livelihood of the working people. At the same time, he 
advocated a land equalization policy, wherein land would be taken from the enemy 
landlord class and given to peasants, thereby abolishing exploitative feudal relations in 
the rural areas by turning the land over to the private ownership of the peasants (Mao 
Tse-tung 1940). This policy permitted small rich peasants or independent producers to 
flourish in the first instance as advanced agricultural producers who would fuel the 
production required to get the devastated Chinese economy back on its feet, following 
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years of warlordism, civil war, imperialist intervention, and war with Japan. Hence, the 
New Democracy version of the enemy/friend dichotomy was designed to garner as many 
‘friends’ as possible to help with the all-important task of national and economic 
reconstruction, whilst simultaneously introducing a Marxist-based conception of people 
without property as being inherently more revolutionary and politically progressive than 
members of the commercial classes and former social elites. 
 
The ambiguous positioning of China’s commercial classes as problematic friends was 
reinforced both prior to the founding of the PRC and throughout the 1950s via claims 
regarding the political and moral legitimacy of CCP rule, a claim which extended to the 
realm of sexual relations. As Gary Sigley (2006: 46) explains, the early CCP initially held 
radical views on sexual relations, for example, it promoted ‘a romanticized view of 
sexual liberation as part and parcel of human liberation’. However, these views were 
undermined by a corollary tendency to foster the latent hostility of CCP supporters 
towards those defined as enemies, often by highlighting the inequality and sexual 
decadence wherein rich landlords, private entrepreneurs, and members of the 
Guomindang, kept concubines and mistresses while ‘poor men struggled to find a solitary 
mate’ and earn a living (ibid.). Augmenting its claim to political legitimacy, the early 
CCP maintained that New China, being based on sound material conditions of social 
equality, inevitably would be morally superior to Old China. Specifically, the early CCP 
indicated that it had the capacity not only to rescue China from foreign aggressors, but 
also to overturn its derogatory appellative as ‘the Sick Man of Asia’. This appellative was 
ascribed to China by nineteenth century Western political philosophers by virtue of its 
characteristic corruption, feudal-style servitude of peasants, and the debased position of 
women, and it was viewed as a mark of national shame by many Chinese intellectuals. 
According to Mao Zedong, the CCP—and only the CCP—had the political vision 
required to create a New China that would be politically free, economically prosperous, 
and enlightened, i.e., that would not be kept ignorant and backward under the sway of 
Old China’s Confucian, semi-feudal, semi-capitalist, and imperialist culture (Mao Tse-
tung 1940). 
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Claims regarding the political and moral superiority of Chinese socialism were given 
concrete expression through the actions of the newly-victorious CCP shortly after its 
adoption of political power in 1949. Following Engels ([1884] 1972), the early CCP 
viewed the institutions of prostitution and (Confucian-bourgeois) marriage as indicative 
of the debased position of women under feudal-capitalist patriarchy, and therefore as 
incompatible with the desired goals of building socialism and establishing more equitable 
socio-sexual relations (Jeffreys 2004: 76-8). Despite facing a daunting set of problems—a 
ruined economy, a wary population, and ongoing civil war, they implemented a series of 
campaigns that resulted in the virtual eradication of rampant prostitution and venereal 
diseases, and introduced the 1950 Marriage Law. This Law was the first item of 
legislation to be promulgated in the PRC and promoted free-choice marriage by 
outlawing arranged marriages and concubinage. These actions are celebrated to this day 
not only for demonstrating the political capacity and moral integrity of Chinese 
socialism, but also for effecting an ‘earth-shaking historic change in the social status and 
condition of women’ (Information Office 1994; Xin and Xiao (eds) 2000). Indeed, the 
revival of prostitution and mistress-keeping in the reform era is often presented as 
phenomena that the CCP successfully eliminated in the 1950s and must eliminate once 
again to demonstrate its continued moral and political legitimacy. 
 
However, a combination of political events, not least of which was the advent of the Cold 
War and USA support of South Korea and Taiwan, meant that the New Democracy 
rendition of China’s national bourgeoisie as ‘friends’ proved to be short-lived. Captains 
of industry and former Nationalist-government bureaucrats were still viewed as useful 
members of the new state insofar as they could assist with the desired goal of advancing a 
nationalized program of rapid industrialization and establishing the necessary 
governmental structures to do so. But, in a climate of heightened political and national 
insecurity, fears regarding the inherent inclination of this group towards conciliation with 
‘the enemies of the revolution’ became more pronounced (Mao Tse-tung 1940). These 
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fears were exacerbated by the severing of political and economic ties between the CCP 
and the former Soviet Union in the mid-1950s, flowing from Khruschev’s unexpected 
denunciation of Stalin and the corollary announcement that the Soviet Union and the 
USA could operate on the basis of ‘peaceful coexistence’, which implied the 
abandonment of support for international communism. The ensuing Sino-Soviet split led 
to accusations that the leadership of the former Soviet Union was revisionist—it was 
taking the revolution backwards towards capitalism (Chang 1978: 209-20). 
 
Fears that the future of the PRC and the Chinese revolution were in jeopardy ensured that 
those defined as enemies or ‘inclined towards conciliation’ became the subject of 
escalating political and physical attack throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1950s, a 
series of campaigns were launched initially against straightforward counterrevolutionary 
targets, such as members of the Guomindang, exploitative big landlords, and major 
entrepreneurs. However, as these campaigns gathered momentum they increasingly 
targeted fringe members of those groups—people who had thrown in their allegiances 
with the CCP and the new state, but whose political affiliations were viewed as suspect 
due to their class background and former affiliations. Associated campaigns against 
corruption among officialdom and economic crimes in private business during the early 
1950s (sanfan wufan), and then against ‘non-socialist’ intellectual activity during the late 
1950’s anti-rightist campaign, ultimately culminated in the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, which is now dated as lasting from 1966 to 1976 (Strauss 2006: 891-912). 
 
During the Cultural Revolution, members of the revolutionary classes, especially Chinese 
youth, were enjoined to attack China’s newly engendered bourgeoisie, defined as those 
members of the Party and state personnel in positions of privilege and authority who were 
taking the capitalist road (Chang 1978: 209-20). While generating widespread anarchy 
and personal tragedy due to the arbitrary manner in which ‘the (friendly) people’ chose to 
target and abuse others as enemies, the concept of a capitalist-roader had quite specific 
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referents at the level of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong theory. It referred to members 
of the CCP and state personnel who were accused of leading the revolution backwards 
into capitalism rather than forward into communism, either by taking advantage of their 
position to monopolize the redistribution of wealth, or else by promoting ‘capitalist’ 
relations of production, such as small production, material incentives, and a technological 
and managerial elite (ibid.). 
 
The Cultural Revolution critique of corruption and capitalist relations of production also 
encompassed a condemnation of ‘the bourgeois style of life’, which included seeking and 
using personal advancement for individual profit and abusing state-allocated positions of 
power and authority to commandeer the sexual services of women (ibid.: 219; Honig 
2003: 162-4). As with the CCP’s early efforts to foster hostility towards those defined as 
enemies by highlighting the decadence and social inequality wherein rich landlords and 
private entrepreneurs kept concubines and frequented prostitutes, such criticisms made 
sexual morality a major concern. Red Guards, in particular, often invoked charges of 
sexual ‘errors’ as part of broader political attacks on capitalist-roaders, indiscriminately 
targeting individual authors for promoting bourgeois (romantic) love and young, urban 
women for engaging in ‘inappropriate’ sexual relations (Honig 2003: 150-4). 
Concomitantly, the CCP condemned state officials accused of sexually abusing young, 
urban women who had been sent-down to the rural countryside to engage in productive 
labour alongside the peasantry. For example, a 1970 Central Committee policy document 
establishes legal punishments for state officials who had obliged sent-down female youth 
to acquiesce to rape, or enter into marriage, in order to obtain access to scarce resources 
such as better food and jobs, and the possibility of a transfer back to their original urban 
location (ibid.: 163-4). The Cultural Revolution attack on China’s new bourgeoisie thus 
aimed to produce a new generation of revolutionary successors who would both uphold 
Chinese Marxism and actively oppose perceived feudal-capitalist practices that were 
deemed to foster hedonism, materialism, inequality, and sexual exploitation. 
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In short, the CCP’s historical denunciation of the bourgeoisie runs counter not only to 
liberal accounts of the middle classes as the epitome of civic virtue and progressive 
political change, but also to popular constructions of contemporary entrepreneurs as the 
modern inheritors of that tradition, particularly in the context of developing countries. 
Simplistically speaking, Western liberal political theory describes the middle classes as 
emerging from the historical processes of industrialization and being at the forefront of 
progressive demands for franchise and liberal democracy. This account is bound-up with 
a theologically-informed view of human nature and capacities. As Tawney (1938) 
explains in Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, the liberal construction of the middle and 
commercial classes as the standard-bearers of enlightened progress turns on the 
conflation of personal character with personal success, or the assumption that the 
enterprising energy of the good, and implicitly godly, man will be rewarded with material 
success. One consequence of this liberal-protestant stress on individual character as 
opposed to circumstances is that poverty tends to be equated with moral failing, and 
individual wealth is viewed as a blessing that is occasionally abused, rather than as a 
natural object of moral suspicion (ibid.: 227-30). 
 
Although the genealogy of modern entrepreneurship is more nuanced than portrayed here 
(Wahrman 1995), popular definitions of entrepreneurship clearly draw on the liberal-
protestant assumption that success is tied to individual character, a character that is 
assumed to be progressive and, by definition, moral (at least in terms of adhering to 
entrepreneurial principles). This point can be illustrated with reference to web-based 
definitions of entrepreneurship. To summarize some standard examples: entrepreneurship 
is a mindset, personality is the key. An entrepreneur is an habitually creative, innovative, 
and educated risk-taker, someone who is the master of their own fate because they seek 
opportunities and exploit contacts and resources that other people do not see 
(‘Entrepreneur’ (n.d.); ‘The entrepreneur’ (n.d.)). These innovating entrepreneurs have a 
‘very American [read democratic] virtue’: they ‘want to make it possible for the whole 
population to enjoy products previously available only to the elite’ (Pascall 2005). 
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In contrast, the early CCP followed the broad parameters of Marxist theory by 
repudiating the liberal-protestant ethos of nineteenth century Europe—that wealth is 
intrinsic to the individual and a fitting reward for civic and private virtue—and by 
condemning capitalism as being equivalent to theft and slavery (Marx 1967). Convinced 
that ‘human nature’ is a product of the particular system of political and economic 
relations that a society establishes for itself, the CCP set about smashing China’s old 
owners of the means of production, replacing them with a new bureaucratic and 
managerial group of Party-state personnel that was supposed to work selflessly in the 
interests of nationalized industry, the revolution, and the people. Yet, having created this 
group, the CCP promptly proceeded to denounce many of its members for constituting a 
new bourgeoisie, accusing them of promoting capitalist relations of production and 
perpetuating the feudal-Confucian exploitation of women (Chang 1978: 209-20). 
 
Reference to these different genealogical underpinnings helps to explain why business 
people and individuals engaging in economic activities for personal profit continue to be 
viewed as morally suspect in economic-reform China. It also helps to explain why 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs, especially those whose life-styles are associated with high-
level consumption practices and extra-marital affairs are routinely exposed to public 
scandal on the grounds of economic and sexual corruption. Indeed, to the extent that 
media accounts of the links between the new rich and corruption in China are apposite, 
corrupt bureaucratic entrepreneurs continue to be condemned as enemies of ‘the people 
with no property’ for abusing their positions of power and privilege to gain unfair access 
to public resources and female sexual services. 
 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics 
 
China’s post-1978 shift to a market economy and the recent popularization of Jiang 
Zeming’s ‘Three Represents’ theory has overturned the Maoist enemy/friend dichotomy 
by actively encouraging members of the commercial classes to join the CCP in building 
socialism with Chinese characteristics. According to Jiang Zemin (2002), the Three 
Represents is about ‘keeping pace with the times and blazing new trails for the 
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development of Marxist theory’: it means uniting with the innovative, advanced 
productive forces to make China strong and the Chinese people rich. Members of this 
group include: free-lance professionals, private entrepreneurs, managerial and technical 
staff employed by non-public and overseas-funded enterprises, and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs as a matter of course. Jiang concludes that ‘the people’—members of the 
working class, farmers and intellectuals—should unite with the pioneering, advanced 
productive forces, because: ‘it is improper to judge whether people are politically 
progressive or backward simply by whether they own property or how much property 
they own’. Instead of equating personal wealth with political incorrectness, Jiang 
suggests that the Chinese public should judge members of new rich based on whether 
they uphold Chinese Marxism, how they have acquired and used their property, and how 
their work has contributed to the goal of building socialism with Chinese characteristics 
(ibid.). 
 
While displacing the Maoist dichotomy of ‘the people’ versus ‘the bourgeoisie’, the 
concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics does not so much sever previous links 
between political and moral sensibility as reactivate them under the rubric of socialist 
spiritual civilization. In the words of Jiang Zemin (2002), the task of building socialism 
with Chinese characteristics requires attaching equal importance to material, economic 
development and spiritual civilization and therefore running the country ‘by combining 
the rule of law with the rule of virtue’ (accepted Chinese values). Although the precise 
nature of these values is debated, they clearly refer to principles enshrined in the Chinese 
Constitution and education system such as the ‘Five Loves’ or civic virtues—love of the 
motherland, the people, labour, science and socialism, and ultimately love of Chinese 
Marxism and the CCP (Li Ping et al. 2004: 449-64; Jiang 2002). They also refer to the 
historical accomplishments and renewed goals of the CCP in terms of eliciting public 
support for campaigns against the resurgent phenomena of corruption and prostitution, 
and, by implication, an incorrect preference for bourgeois, Western life-styles. 
 
Hu Jintao, for example, prescribed a socialist concept of honour and disgrace at the Tenth 
National People’s Congress in 2006 as follows: ‘know plain living and hard struggle, do 
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not wallow in luxuries and pleasures’ (‘President Hu’ 2006). Hu’s virtuous living list was 
upheld by the China Daily as offering a positive contribution to China’s efforts to 
produce an advanced socialist culture by trying to combat corruption and ‘close the gap’ 
between the elite who have profited from economic reforms and the poor majority (ibid.). 
His prescription revives calls associated with the early campaigns of the reform era which 
aimed to reinvigorate public belief in the historical accomplishments and values of 
Chinese socialism, in the form of late 1980s and early 1990s campaigns against spiritual 
pollution, (Western) bourgeois liberalization, and the ‘six evils’ (???). The dual advocacy 
of material and socialist spiritual civilization is therefore intended to expand the 
membership base of the CCP, whilst simultaneously inducing compliance from local 
networks of officials and entrepreneurs by encouraging them to act as model citizens and 
stopping them from engaging in corrupt and morally unacceptable behaviours. 
 
The phenomenon of sex-related bribery and corruption (xing huilu) is one of the most 
recent and controversial expressions of cadre corruption and misconduct in China. Jin 
Weidong, a former MA student from the Law Faculty at Nanjing University, is credited 
with inventing this term when he presented a paper on the subject of sex-related bribery 
and corruption to the ‘Jiangsu Province Seminar on Criminal Law Research’ on 6 
December 2000 (Meng 2001). In this paper, Jin acknowledges that the trade in power and 
sex (quanse jiaoyi) had taken place in Mao’s China, in the form of both high and low-
ranking cadres abusing their positions of power and authority to have sex with women in 
exchange for the promise of work transfers and promotions (Zhi 2001). That said, such 
practices remained highly restricted during the Maoist era due to the tight social control 
networks that were exercised through the regulation and development of the household 
registration and work-unit systems. In contrast, the practice of businessmen using or 
hiring female sexual service providers to bribe bureaucratic entrepreneurs into giving 
them favourable business deals or protection has become commonplace in the reform era. 
Hence, Jin concludes that the Chinese penal code should be amended to criminalize the 
activities of Party and government officials who accept or solicit a bribe in the form of 
sexual services (Dai and Lu 2000). 
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Jin Weidong’s call to criminalize the phenomenon of sex-related bribery and corruption 
sparked widespread debate due to the popular perception that this far from virtuous form 
of corruption is increasing, despite the introduction of new legal sanctions. In China, the 
Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection is responsible for 
handling corruption cases. Historically, this meant that high-ranking officials remained 
outside of the reach of the Criminal Law, being dealt with on the basis of Party 
disciplinary regulations and other administrative sanctions. However, since September 
1997, when Chen Xitong’s case was handed over to the courts, a growing number of 
high-ranking officials have been tried for corruption by the state procuratorial organs 
(Hao 1999: 414).
 
Chen Xitong, former Mayor and Communist Party Secretary of the city 
of Beijing, was sentenced by a Chinese court in 1998 to 16 years imprisonment on 
charges of corruption and dereliction of duty. The public trial of this senior official 
coincided with the introduction of the PRC’s revised Criminal Law of 1997, signifying a 
new understanding that all citizens are equal under the ‘rule of law’. 
 
The revised ‘Chinese Communist Party discipline regulations’ (1997: 15-16) also 
explicitly penalize cadre involvement in the trading of power and sex. Article 132 of 
these regulations, under the heading ‘Mistakes that seriously violate socialist ethics’, 
states that any party member who has sexual intercourse with others by ‘using their 
powers, their superior or senior positions, seduction, cheating, or other means, shall be 
dismissed from their party posts’. Concomitantly, the Chinese government has sought to 
ban cadre involvement in the running of public entertainment venues and practices such 
as the use of public funds to cover entertainment costs that may also involve sex-related 
services. In the early 1990s, the National Bureau of Statistics estimated that between 60 
and 70 per cent of the income accruing to high-grade hotels, guesthouses, restaurants and 
karaoke/dance venues, came from male bureaucratic entrepreneurs spending public funds 
to wine, dine, and purchase the company of women, at an estimated annual cost to the 
public of around 800 billion yuan (Jeffreys 2006: 168-9). Hence, during the mid to late 
1990s, China’s relevant authorities introduced a whole host of regulations designed to 
curb the spending of public funds within such venues and to ban members of the public 
security forces, and other kinds of government employees, both from running recreational 
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and entertainment venues and from protecting illegal business operations in this 
connection. These measures are now being enforced, not strictly on the basis of police-
led campaigns and information derived from public informants, but also on the basis of 
disciplinary procedures that are integral to the reform era itself, namely, via the practice 
established in 1998 of auditing government officials, and thereby combining the 
resources of the CCP’s disciplinary committees with those of the State Auditing 
Administration (ibid.). 
 
Yet the majority of high-ranking corruption cases are still linked to the trade in power 
and sex. According to an unspecified investigation conducted in Guangzhou, Shenzhen 
and Zhuhai during 1999, more than 95 per cent of 102 high-ranking government officials 
who were tried for corruption had a ‘mistress or second wife’ (bao ernai), and some even 
had three or four mistresses (Shao 2002; Wang and Liu 2000). Investigations conducted 
by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the 
All-China Women’s Federation similarly suggest that virtually every corrupt official has 
a mistress or second wife (Xie Donghui 2003; Zhao 2001: 7). Given that the cost of 
keeping such women allegedly comes from public monies at an estimated cost of 
US$700-1,000 per mistress per month, or else from funds provided by another party with 
the anticipation of obtaining illegitimate benefits, it is not surprising that the issue of 
sexual bribery and corruption has been publicly condemned as yet another instance of the 
perceived manifest abuse of power in China, and one that adds to the PRC’s growing 
number of social problems relating to the family and marriage (Jeffreys 2006: 162). 
 
A standard explanation for China’s renewed trade in power and sex is that increased 
public tolerance of pre-marital and extra-marital affairs in the post-Mao era has meant 
that sexual affairs outside of marriage are no longer viewed as a political matter. Instead, 
sex between consenting adults is increasingly understood as a private affair, with 
practices relating to the selling and buying of sex and the keeping of a mistress being 
viewed as a moral or life-style problem, not as a legitimate target of punitive 
governmental intervention (Wang and Liu 2000). Concomitantly, the ostentatious life-
styles associated with China’s newly rich class of private business entrepreneurs have 
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become the paradoxical focus of public praise and condemnation, with many people 
desiring a taste of the ‘good life’ for themselves, and others criticizing the new rich for 
transgressing socialist values. Media reports, for instance, frequently condemn the high-
consumption life-styles of China’s business entrepreneurs, whilst simultaneously regaling 
their readers with voyeuristic stories of how such men can be recognized instantly by the 
presence of beautiful young women by their sides (ibid.). 
 
Media reports suggest that growing public tolerance of extra-marital and commercial sex 
has encouraged the unlawful practice of businessmen using or hiring female sexual 
service providers to bribe party officials and company managers into giving them 
favourable business deals or protection (Li Zhufeng 2002: 22-3). As they argue, veteran 
cadres who have dedicated their life to the revolution are neither easily seduced by the 
offer of material forms of bribery, nor are they overly willing to engage in outright acts of 
embezzlement or graft (Meng 2001; Wang Jin 2002). The introduction of economic 
reforms undoubtedly has opened the window for a small if highly corrupt number of 
government officials to accept bribes and appropriate state resources on a grand scale. 
But the introduction of harsh legal sanctions against such measures, combined with the 
traditional Maoist condemnation of such activities and the raising of cadre salaries, has 
ensured that most Party members and working personnel of the state still view such 
activities as morally and politically reprehensible. Consequently, most working personnel 
of the state will reject offers of bribery unless the offer involves extraordinary sums of 
money or property (ibid.). However, when it comes to the issue of sex, the story is 
reportedly different. Cadres who would otherwise resist involvement in bribery and 
corruption are easily led on to the path of ‘moral decay’ because they no longer see the 
provision of sexual services as a political and social order problem (Zhao 2001). Recent 
cases therefore have involved not only new bureaucratic entrepreneurs (predominantly 
men between 29-49 years of age), but also veteran cadres of 59 years of age or older 
(Wang and Liu 2000; Watts 2006). 
 
Media reports further insist that China’s rapidly changing sexual culture has led to an 
increase in the practice of women offering themselves as a bribe to bureaucratic 
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entrepreneurs in return for work promotions and other opportunities (ibid.). A frequently 
cited example in this regard is the case of Jiang Yanping, who was tried on 20-23 March 
2001 for embezzlement and abusing her official position to gain favourable business 
deals for members of her family (Da 2002). Although Jiang was subsequently castigated 
in the Chinese press as an example of ‘upstart official’ who obtained a senior position by 
sleeping with her superiors, she is also claimed to have defended her actions by stating: 
‘In a male-dominated world, a smart woman has to exploit the value that men place on 
the female sex’ (Li Zhufeng 2002: 22-3). Flowing from an examination of this and other 
cases, media reporters maintain that the motivations for offering sex-related bribes have 
also proliferated. Apart from longstanding factors such as obtaining employment, 
promotion or a work transfer, they now include: gaining Party membership; obtaining 
housing; facilitating business deals; avoiding legal punishment; and promoting smuggling 
operations (Feng 2001: 93–6). 
 
In sum, there is a broad consensus that something has to be done about the phenomenon 
of sexual bribery and corruption in China, but the question of whether that problem 
should be resolved by recourse to ‘the rule of law’ or ‘the rule of virtue’ is disputed. 
Those who oppose the criminalization of this phenomenon claim that it is essentially a 
moral issue, and therefore an inappropriate target of legally based governmental 
intervention (Jeffreys 2006: 159-78). They argue that recourse to the time-honoured 
method of seeking compliance through the provision of ideological and moral education, 
which now includes supervision by ‘the masses’ in the form of exposés in the Chinese 
media, constitutes a more appropriate response. Conversely, those who support the 
criminalization of sexual bribery and corruption tend to focus on legal and judicial reform 
in the name of consolidating China’s post-Mao shift to a ‘rule of law’. They insist that 
counter-arguments based on notions of mutual consent and privacy function to excuse the 
existence of sex-related bribery and corruption by portraying it as a ‘life-style problem’ 
of the propertied classes, rather than a serious social order problem (He (ed.) 2002). What 
contributors to both sides of this debate have in common is a belief that the ‘sex’ in sex-
related bribery and corruption is neither moral nor right: it is an expression of bourgeois 
right insofar as the privileged access of bureaucratic entrepreneurs to public resources 
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and the commodified sexual services of women is viewed as an unfair display of their 
inequitable share of personal wealth proportional to the work they contribute to the 




Western constructions of China’s new rich as the middle class vanguard of progressive 
social change are undermined by the routine portrayal of this group in the Chinese media 
as both advanced economic producers and polluters of socialist virtue. Despite state-led 
efforts to improve the reputation of China’s new rich, in the form of promoting provincial 
and national model entrepreneurs, the Chinese public reportedly still assumes that ‘no 
rich man is a good man’ and that private entrepreneurs are particularly prone to displays 
of extra-marital sexual impropriety in the form of hiring the services of female prostitutes 
and keeping ‘second wives’ (Toy 2007: 15). The ostentatious consumption of sexual 
services by private entrepreneurs as a means to affirm their wealth and privileged social 
status is also blamed for leading bureaucratic entrepreneurs on the road to moral decline. 
Such criticisms turn on the reactivation of former CCP claims to guarantee social and 
sexual equality, and, in doing so, offer both support and a challenge to the legitimacy of 
continued one-party rule. 
 
Public condemnation of China’s so-called ‘mistress and prostitution boom’ entails an 
explicit criticism of the CCP for creating the market conditions in which such 
phenomenon can flourish in the first place, whilst simultaneously upholding the Party-
state’s historically proven capacity and hence assumed capacity to redress them in the 
future. Indeed, although the Chinese media often present female sex sellers as ‘fallen 
women’ who will happily forsake their virtue for money, they also routinely present them 
as young, poor and rural women who are disadvantaged by the reform process, and who 
therefore deserve to be treated with sympathy and concern. Beijing lawyer, Zheng 
Baichun, for example, has recently established a website that provides legal advice to 
‘second wives’ and advocates for ‘mistress rights’ on the grounds that such women are 
victimized by society, when they are themselves the victims of social and gendered 
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inequalities (http://www.2n88.com). The perceived decline in social and sexual equality 
in reform-era China is also integral to arguments that the existence of commercial sexual 
services in entertainment and leisure venues stems from the ongoing demand for such 
services by male members of the new rich, including private and bureaucratic 
entrepreneurs. 
 
However, to the extent that voices in China’s media and academia routinely call on the 
Chinese government to realize prosperity for all, and to resolve the interlinked problems 
of declining moral standards and sex-related corruption, it appears that China still needs 
the Chinese Communist Party. Media accounts of the dubious ways in which the new rich 
obtain and spend their wealth fuel public discontent over the growing chasm between 
China’s ‘haves’ and have-nots’, even as stories of corrupt cadres point to the CCP’s 
declining legitimacy as the (moral) vanguard party. But the Chinese government and 
concerned academics are also portrayed as more determined and innovative than ever 
before in terms of creating new ways of preventing and controlling cadre corruption. 
More than 846,000 CCP members were penalized for corruption of various forms during 
1988 to 2002. Stricter legal sanctions have been accompanied by the introduction of 
auditing and other practices designed to encourage governmental transparency, including 
establishing public accounts for repentant corrupt officials to return bribes. Government 
officials in Nanjing City, Jiangsu Province, are now required to register details both of 
their marital circumstances, and any long-term extra-marital relationship, in a move to 
curb sex-related bribery and corruption (‘New anti-corruption method’ 2005). The All-
China Women’s Federation has also launched a nationwide project to educate wives of 
leading officials about how to build a ‘family firewall’ against corruption (‘China 
promotes anti-graft’ 2006). 
 
Viewed from this perspective, the modernizing mantra that ‘economic reform demands 
(Western-style) political reform’ not only ignores the evident and ongoing capacity of the 
CCP to transform itself by demanding political transparency and accountability within 
the parameters of one-party rule, it also overlooks the other myriad ways in which 
democratic political reform can be effected. Most notably, it discounts the diverse ways 
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in which voices in the Chinese media and academia have both drawn on and reinvented 
the historical legacy of the CCP to demand a form of political liberalization that includes 
issues of social and sexual equality as a matter of course. Social and gender equity is a 
component of modern democratic change that is given scant attention in most accounts of 
‘why China does not need the Chinese Communist Party’. If criticisms of the sex-





1 The ‘productive forces’ is a central concept in Marxism. It refers to the combination of 
the means of production with human labour power and encompasses all those forces that 
are applied by people in the production process. The productive forces are thus the unity 
of the means of production—the tools (instrument) and the raw material (subject) you use 
to create something—and human labour, see Marxists.org (n.d.). 
 
2 In Marxist parlance, the term ‘bourgeoisie’ refers to the class of modern capitalists, 
owners of the means of social production and the employers of wage labour. This class 
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